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AD HOC COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
STATUTES: THE NEW DEVICE FOR
SETTLING NATIONAL EMERGENCY
LABOR DISPUTES
The recent labor disputes in the railroad and airline industries
once again demonstrated the need for a legal device to avert work
stoppages that would cause irreparable damage to the national
economy. Although compulsory arbitration is almost universally
opposed by both labor and management and had never before
been imposed on American industry in peace time, Congress
embraced a strictly limited form of this settlement process in
enacting Public Laws 88-108 and 90-54. This comment reviews
the recent experience under these two ad hoc statutes passed to
prevent national rail strikes. The particular problems arising
under these statutes, as well as the policy ends served, are
analyzed, and provisions to be included in any future ad hoc
compulsory arbitration scheme are suggested.
S trikes by employees whose services are essential to the national
welfare have precipitated the criticism that present federal law
provides inadequate protection against the consequences of national
emergency labor disputes. On three occasions in the past five years,
Congress confronted the problem of work stoppages in industries
critical to the national health and safety: first in the 1963 railroad
work rules dispute,' then in the airline strike in 1966,2 and again in
1967 when another railroad labor dispute threatened the essential
transportation services of the nation.3 Since existing federal labor law
leaves disputants ultimately free to strike or lockout,4 regardless of the
disastrous effect on the public as a whole, Congress has had to decide
'SeeS. REP. No. 459,88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. REP. No. 713, 88th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1963).
'See S.J. Res. 186, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. REP. No. 1424, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966); 112 CONG. REC. 18055-099, 18287-323 (1966).
' See S. REP. No. 292,90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. REP. No. 353,90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967).
4 The sections of the Taft-Hartley Act which deal with national emergency disputes set forth a
series of detailed procedures, mainly involving delaying actions, which can be invoked to stall a
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in each instance whether to enact special legislation to resolve such
disputes. Among those legal devices proposed for resolving national
emergency labor disputes and for protecting the public interest, none
is more an anathema to labor and management than compulsory
arbitration.'
The notable exception to the general opposition to compulsory
arbitration is in the railroad industry,6 which by virtue of legislation
enacted in 1963 and 1967 has had the only recent experience with this
settlement process. The legal effect of Public Laws 88-1081 and 90-548
extended only to settlement of the particular disputes at hand, but the
conflicts involving competing public policies and technical legal
construction of the statutes suggest problems that would have to be
resolved under a general compulsory arbitration system. More
significantly, Public Laws 88-108 and 90-54 provide the only
framework for testing the new method that Congress has adopted to
deal with national emergency labor disputes-compulsory arbitration
imposed by temporary ad hoc legislation. In an effort to assess the
implications for future legislation, this comment explores the
distinctions between compulsory arbitration and common voluntary
arbitration in light of the policy concerns behind each, and analyzes
the litigation resulting from these two innovative statutes.
The Nature of Compulsory Arbitration
Compulsory arbitration is a process of settlement of labor
disputes whereby the parties are required by law to accept a third
work stoppage in a critical industry. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §§
206-210, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-80 (1964); see Rehmus, Operation of the National Emergency
Provisions of LMRA, 62 YALE L.J. 1047 (1953). Similarly, the Railway Labor Act prescribes
procedures for altering the terms of employment in the railroad and airlines industries, with
provision for mediation and "cooling off" periods in the event of disputes which threaten serious
work stoppages. Railway Labor Act §§ 6-10, 45 U.S.C. §§ 156-60 (1964). But under both
statutes, the right to resort to self-help in the event of a total breakdown in the settlement
machinery is preserved. See Florida E.C. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172,
181 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 990 (1965).
1 See Railroads v. Operating Brotherhoods, 41 Lab. Arb. 673, 698 (Bd. of Arb. 1964) (dissent
of R. McDonald); H.R. REP. No. 353, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); 112 CONG. REC. 18063-
065 (1966) (remarks of Senator Morse); 1966 ABA LABOR RELATIONS SECTION 323-24; Currie,
Foreword, 12 LAW & CONTEIP. PROB. 209, 210 (1947); Cushman, Paradoxes in Labor-
Management Relations, 4 LAB. REL. REP. 8097 (1967) (statement of NLRB general counsel).
See also Nat'l Ass'n Mfrs., Settlement of Labor Disputes and Wage Stabilization, May 2, 1951.
6 See 1966 ABA LABOR RELATIONS SECTION 341-43.
7 Act of August 28, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-108, 77 Stat. 132.
s Act of July 17, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-54, 81 Stat. 122.
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party's resolution of the disputed issues.9 As an essential corollary of
compulsory arbitration, the ultimate self-help weapons of strike and
lockout are outlawed. 0 Although voluntary arbitration achieves the
same result of precluding work stoppages, it differs from compulsory
arbitration in that a voluntary arbitration award derives its force
from the parties' consent to an arbitration submission agreement,
rather than by the authority of an underlying legislative fiat. This
distinction emphasizes the mandatory nature of the compulsory
arbitration process by clearly identifying the power which removes
from the parties their right to strike or lockout. A further difference is
that the procedures and rules customarily followed in voluntary
arbitration are not necessarily required by compulsory arbitration
legislation. For example, whereas a voluntary arbitration panel
usually must consider only the evidence presented in making its
award, the Special Board established under Public Law 90-54 had
power to compromise the parties' interests without regard to the
evidence." Keeping these distinctions in mind, the law which has
developed around voluntary arbitration may still be highly relevant to
an analysis of many legal issues raised by compulsory arbitration
statutes.
In considering the practical as well as the legal issues raised by
compulsory arbitration legislation, a distinction must be made
9 See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 12 (1960); Sanders, Types of
Labor Disputes and Approaches to Their Settlement, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 211, 216-17
(1947); Williams, The Compulsory Settlement of Contract Negotiation Labor Disputes, 27
TEXAS L. REV. 587, 588 (1949); Should the Federal Government Require Arbitration of Labor
Disputes in All Basic American Industries, 26 CONG. DIG. 193, 195 (1947). But cf Sturges,
"Compulsory Arbitration"--What Is It?, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1961). Although Professor
Sturges' analysis of the different settlement processes that have been called compulsory
arbitration demonstrates some confusion as to the precise meaning of the term, common usage
emphasizes the compulsory nature of this settlement process, as do the commentators cited
above. See, e.g., TIME, March 1, 1968, at 35; Washington Post, June 1, 1967, at AI8, col. 1;
N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1966, at 46, col. 1.
For a selected bibliography listing recent publications on the subject of compulsory
arbitration see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: SELECTED REFERENCES
1951-66 (February 1966).
10 See Frey, The Logic of Collective Bargaining and Arbitration, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
264,272 (1947); Williams, supra note 9, at 588.
"See S. REP. No. 292, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); 113 CONG. REC. 7783 (daily ed. June 7,
1967) (remarks of Senator Morse). Also, unlike the provisions of Public Law 90-54, voluntary
arbitration procedures sometimes require that the proponent of an issue carry the burden of
proof on that issue, and establish his position by a preponderance of the evidence. See S. REP.
No. 292,90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); ELKOURI, supra note 9, at 416-19.
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between temporary as opposed to permanent laws imposing this
settlement process. With respect to the espoused national policy of
promoting collective bargaining,"2 a permanent compulsory
arbitration statute would clearly be more objectionable to those critics
who believe it would destroy collective bargaining. 3 On the other
hand, some drawbacks of the ad hoc approach can be seen in the
uncertainty resulting from the need for new legislation to meet each
new crisis, and in the technical problems of drafting statutes to resolve
only the particular issues which are in dispute. Once a compulsory
arbitration statute is enacted, whether it is permanent or temporary,
would be relevant in resolving such issues as the preemptive effect on
state laws regulating the same employment problems. 4
Another distinction useful in analyzing Public Laws 88-108 and
90-54, especially in assessing their value as precedent, is based upon
the differences between the two fundamental types of labor-manage-
ment conflicts: grievance disputes and new contract negotiations.'"
Grievance disputes grow out of disagreements in the interpretation or
application of an existing labor contract,' 6 and are commonly
resolved by voluntary arbitration,' 7 or, in the airline and railroad
industries, by compulsory arbitration under section 3 of the Railway
Labor Act. 8 In grievance arbitration cases, the arbitrator has the
basically judicial function of construing the language of the labor
"See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964). This statute expressly
declares encouragement of the practice and procedure of collective bargaining to be the policy of
the United States. See id.
* See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
* See notes 116-26 infra and accompanying text.
11See T. Kheel, The Pros and Cons of Compulsory Arbitration 13-15, Feb. 7, 1961 (study
prepared for the New York Chamber of Commerce); Farmer, Compulsory Arbitration-A
Management Lawyer's View, 51 VA. L. REV. 396, 402-04 (1965); Feller, Compulsory
Arbitration-A Union Lawyer's View. 51 VA. L. REV. 410, 411-12 (1965); Sanders, supra
note 9; Williams, supra note 9, at 589.
" See ELKOURI, supra note 9, at 82.
17 A recent analysis of practically all collective bargaining agreements covering 1,000 workers
or more, exclusive of airline, railroad and government labor contracts, revealed that 94% of
these agreements provided for arbitration of some or all grievance disputes. U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-6, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS: ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 5 (1966).
13 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1964). By the provisions of this statute Congress set up the National
Railroad Adjustment Board and gave the Board jurisdiction over grievance disputes in the
industry, including the power to render awards which are final and binding upon both parties.
The Supreme Court has construed these provisions as outlawing strikes and lockouts over such
disputes. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
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contract and thereby adjudicating the "rights" of the parties.' 9 While
a provision for arbitration of grievances is incorporated in almost all
sizeable collective bargaining agreements" and is favored by a strong
federal policy,2' voluntary arbitration is rarely used to resolve labor
disputes over new contract terms;22 even though this type of dispute
accounts for the most serious collective bargaining failures. 23 The
reasons for the general aversion to arbitration of new contract
disputes are exposed in the numerous policy arguments advanced in
opposition to compulsory arbitration.
The Policy Pros and Cons of Compulsory Arbitration
In contract negotiation disputes, management and labor oppose
arbitration on the ground that it segregates decision-making power
from ultimate responsibility on issues that are crucial to their
fundamental interests.24 The great importance of the issues usually
involved in contract negotiations is the core of this objection. Whereas
a grievance dispute may concern the interests of a single employee,
disputes over new contract terms often involve management's fear of a
profit squeeze resulting from increased labor costs, or the union's fear
of a loss of membership due to elimination of featherbedding
" The terminology of "rights" disputes as opposed to "interests" disputes, which involve
negotiations of new labor contracts, was imported from the Scandinavian countries and applied
to American labor law. See Spielmans, Labor Disputes on Rights and on Interests, 29 AM.
EcON. REV. 299 (1939). Essentially, the "rights-interests" analysis classifies labor disputes
along the same lines as the "grievance-contract negotiation" analysis utilized in this comment.
20See note 17 supra.
2 1See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Labor-
Management Relations Act (raft-Hartley Act) § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964).
" See T. Kheel, supra note 15, at 13; Frey, supra note 10, at 277; Jones, Compulsion and the
Consensual in Labor Arbitration, 51 VA. L. REV. 369, 387 (1965). A recent Department of
Labor study found that less than 2% of major collective bargaining agreements provide for
arbitration of new contract terms. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR,
BULL. No. 1425-6, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: ARBITRATION PROCEDURES
95 (1966).
2 3 See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1460, ANALYSIS OF
WORK STOPPAGES' 1964, at 1 (1964); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR,
BULL. No. 1420, ANALYSIS OF WORK STOPPAGES 1963, at 1 (1963); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1381, ANALYSIS OF WORK STOPPAGES 1962, at 1
(1962); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1339, ANALYSIS OF
WORK STOPPAGES 1961, at 1 (1961).
14 See Farmer, supra note 15, at 399; Frey, supra note 10, at 274; Hildebrand, The Resolution
of Impasses, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS: THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB, AND
THE COURTS 287, 291 (1967); Jones, supra note 22, at 387-88.
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practices.25 When parties bargain to impasse and refuse to submit
their dispute to arbitration, the party rejecting arbitration probably
considers his self-interests so affected that he is unwilling to risk a
compromise. Based on these considerations, vehement opposition to
compulsory arbitration is to be expected. 6 But at the same time, from
the standpoint of protecting the public interest and continuing the
operation of essential industries, some provision for mandatory
settlement, such as compulsory arbitration, is necessary in exactly
those instances where the parties refuse to compromise.
Another policy objection raised against compulsory arbitration of
new contracts involves the lack of standards to control the arbitrator's
ruling on contested contract terms. In resolving the issues in a
contract negotiation dispute, the arbitrator is not constrained by the
terms of an existing labor contract, and as a result-unlike the
grievance arbitration process-a reasonable interpretation of contract
language does not delimit the arbitrator's discretionary power.27
Consequently, the ultimate effect of an adverse decision by the third
party cannot be predicted or measured, and this uncertainty generates
increased resistance from both labor and management. However,
since limitations on the authority of the arbitrator and decisional
standards can be prescribed by compulsory arbitration statutes, the
substance of this policy argument is that the rules governing the
arbitrator's discretion are dictated by the legislature rather than by
the disputants who bear the final consequences of the settlement
terms. In this form, the argument simply reiterates the basic objection
to compulsory arbitration's separation of decision-making from
ultimate responsibility.
Critics of compulsory arbitration also charge that this settlement
process has a chilling effect on collective bargaining because the
parties are inclined to make extreme demands and to refuse
compromise on the assumption that the arbitrator will "split the
" The 1963 railroad work rules dispute, which led to virtual elimination of an entire craft and
its union, demonstrated the critical importance of featherbedding issues. See Hearings on the
Administration of Public Law 88-108 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., ser. 89-56, pt. 2, at 1004-062 (1966) (statement of H.E. Gilbert, President, Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen); Levinson, The Locomotive Firemen's Dispute, 17 LAn.
L.J. 671 (1966).
16See T. Kheel, supra note 15, at 13; Farmer, supra note 15, at 403-04; Feller, supra note 15,
at412-15.
"See 1966 ABA LABOR RELATIONS SECTION 323-24; T. Kheel, supra note 15, at 13-14;
Farmer, supra note 15, at 403; Feller, supra note 15, at 412; Frey, supra note 10, at 273.
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difference" when he resolves the dispute.28 Even if this prediction of
union-management behavior is accurate,29 the argument is valid only
if the disputants know that compulsory arbitration will resolve all
impasses. Since the ad hoc approach to settling labor disputes leaves
the disputants uncertain as to which settlement process will be
adopted, if Congress is to act at all, this objection seems inapplicable
to ad hoc compulsory arbitration. Indeed, Congress could fail to act,
as in the airline strike situation,30 or some alternative such as seizure
of the industry could be adopted.3
Finally, enactment of a compulsory arbitration statute is opposed
on the direct grounds that it will not accomplish its legislative purpose
of preventing work stoppages. In support of this conclusion,
management and labor argue that a compulsory arbitration statute is
unenforceable in practice, and that this settlement process actually
causes further disputes by requiring employees to work against their
will. 2 On the issue of enforceability, the problems presented by a
" See T. Kheel, supra note 15, at 18-20; Hildebrand, supra note 24, at 291; Should the Federal
Government Require Arbitration of Labor Disputes in All Basic American Industries, 26
CONG. DiG. 193, 203 (1947); The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 26, 1968, at 16, col. I.
29 Representative Herlong of Florida, in advocating permanent compulsory arbitration for the
transportation industry, argued that the inducement to bargain and compromise under a
compulsory arbitration system actually should be greater since the parties would prefer to settle
the dispute themselves rather than submit it to the uncertainties of an arbitrator. Herlong,
Transportation Strikes: A Proposal for Corrective Legislation, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 175, 185-
87 (1967).
A related argument is that by precluding a work stoppage as the final bargaining weapon,
compulsory arbitration removes the real motivating force behind collective bargaining. See, e.g.,
1966 ABA LABOR RELATIONS SECTION 324; T. Kheel, supra note 15, at 19-20; Farmer, supra
note 15, at 399-400. But like all criticisms of compulsory arbitration based on its predicted
undermining of collective bargaining, this objection presupposes that the collective bargaining
process is an end in itself superior to that served by any compulsory arbitration statute. In the
modern industrial economy, however, with its high level of interdependence and concomitant
vulnerability to disruption, this assumption may not always be valid.
10 The Senate passed S.J. Res. 186, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), which would have broken the
airline strike for 180 days, but the measure failed to get through the House.
11 Seizure was actively debated and had the support of several powerful legislators during the
1967 railroad labor dispute. During debate of the bill which eventually became Public Law 90-
54, Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts proposed an amendment providing for seizure,
but was defeated. See 113 CONG. REC. 7801-09 (daily ed. June 7, 4967). The "arsenal of
weapons" approach to emergency disputes, whereby the President has a choice of several legal
devices to end a work stoppage, including compulsory arbitration and seizure, also has some
support. See H.R. 5683, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); 113 CONG. REc. 7201-202 (daily ed. June
14, 1967) (remarks of Representative Pickle). For an explanation of the "arsenal of weapons"
approach see Cox, The Uses and Abuses of Union Power, 35 NOTRE DAME LAW. 624 (1960).
11See T. Kheel, supra note 15, at 20-22; Frey, supra note 10, at 274-75; Should the Federal
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compulsory arbitration law are indistinguishable from those inherent
in any non-voluntary settlement process, or in fact, from any situation
where employees are engaged in an illegal strike. Although the
conclusion of unenforceability is questionable, this argument
correctly emphasizes that the efficacy of a compulsory arbitration law
may ultimately depend upon the strike-breaking powers of the courts.
Standing in opposition to all of the foregoing arguments is the sole
policy justification for imposing compulsory arbitration-protection
of the national welfare against the consequences of a cessation of
essential services. When it is reasonably estimated that a one-month
work stoppage in an industry would reduce the gross national product
by 13 percent and raise the unemployment level to 15 percent,-" the
self-interests of the unions and employers involved in the dispute
pale in comparison. Compulsory arbitration is offered by its propo-
nents as an alternative to the economic warfare which must be ac-
cepted if collective bargaining is to remain inviolate.
In view of the intense opposition to compulsory arbitration, it is
not surprising that American experience with this settlement process
has been restricted to special circumstances from which it is difficult
to generalize. In fact, uitil 1963 the only American experience with
compulsory settlement of labor disputes was during wartime,34 and
Government Require Arbitration of Labor Disputes in All Basic American Industries, 26
CONG. DIG. 193, 207 (1947); The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 26, 1968, at 16, col. 1.
" See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO
RAILROAD-LABOR DISPUTES, H.R. Doc. No. 142, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). President
Kennedy described graphically the disasterous repercussions that a national rail strike could be
expected to generate in such an interdependent economy as the United States. The Council of
Economic Advisers estimated that "by the 30th day of a general rail strike, some 6 million
nonrailroad workers would have been laid off in addition to the 200,000 members of the striking
brotherhoods and 500,000 other railroad employees-that unemployment would reach the 15
percent mark for the first time since 1940-and that the decline in or rate of GNP would be
nearly four times as great as the decline which occurred in this nation's worst postwar
recession." Id. at 3.
The forecasted consequences of a national rail strike in 1967 were equally as gloomy. See
H.R. REP. No. 353, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1967). "A one month strike would reduce the gross
national product by 13 percent." Id. The pressures generated by the Vietnam conflict made such
a strike even more potentially damaging.
34 Although in World War I the National War Labor Board had no statutory authority to
compel acceptance of its decisions on the merits of contract negotiation disputes, the President
through his emergency seizure powers was able to assure implementation of the Board's
"suggestions" on the terms and conditions of employment in any crucial industry. For example,
when the recalcitrant management at Smith & Wesson, an arms manufacturer, refused to abide
by the Board's suggested contract terms to end a labor dispute, President Wilson commandeered
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under some limited state statutes. 35 Then, beginning with the work
rules dispute in 1963,36 Congress embraced a new method of using
the plant and instituted the Board's terms. For an analysis of the activity of the World War I
War Labor Board see Gregg, The National War Labor Board, 33 HART. L. REV. 39 (1919).
The World War II experience with compulsory arbitration was much more extensive, since
the War Labor Disputes Act, 57 Stat. 163 (1943), and the Stabilization Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 765
(1942), granted the President power to control wages and hours, to seize struck plants, and to
institute such changes in working conditions as the War Labor Board might have recommended.
Since it was a criminal offense to strike a seized plant, the union strike powers were nullified.
Under the auspices of this War Labor Board, all labor disputes of national consequence were
subject to compulsory settlement on terms dictated by a third party. For commentary on the
experience under this dispute settlement process see C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 387
(1946); Jaffe, Post- War Labor Relations: The Contributions of the War Labor Board, 29 IOWA
L. REV. 276 (1944); Morse, The National War Labor Board Puts Labor Law Theory Into
Action, 29 IOWA L. REV. 175 (1944).
The wartime labor experience is most often discounted on grounds of the extraordinary threat
to national survival which then existed, and also on the basis of a no strike-no lock out pledge
voluntarily made at the beginning of the war by both labor and management. But it is also
significant that the wartime experience was comprehensive and of indefinite duration as
distinguished from the ad hoe and temporary nature of the settlement process embraced by
Public Law 88-108 and 90-54.
35 State statutes now providing for compulsory arbitration of labor disputes apply solely to the
state public utilities industries which are not covered by the National Labor Relations Act or
Railway Labor Act. For an analysis of this legislation see Shenton, Compulsory Arbitration in
the Public Service, 17 LAB. L.J. 138 (1966).
There is no case in which a state legislature has acted to resolve a labor impasse by the process
of ad hoc compulsory arbitration. The state statutes aim at particular industries, simply
outlawing work stoppages, rather than compelling resolutions of particular disputes, as did
Public Laws 88-108 and 90-54.
'6 The work rules dispute leading to enactment of Public Law 88-108 involved attempts by the
carriers to eliminate certain jobs made superfluous by technological improvements in the
industry.
In railroad parlance, "work rules" are the extensive set of rules composed of collective
bargained agreements, judicial decisions, and administrative rulings accumulated since the
beginnings of governmental control. The work rules have been described as the "common law"
of railroad labor relations. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & B.B. R.R., 385 F.2d
581 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968); see REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
RAILROAD COMMISSION 3 (1962). The particular work rules in dispute in 1963 dealt with two
aspects of railroad employment and operations policy: (1) the fireman issue-whether to con-
tinue the use of a fireman on diesel engines carrying freight; and (2) the crew consist issue-
whether to reduce the size of train crews. The exact technical nature of these disputed issues
is examined in REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL RAILROAD COMMISSION (1962). For an ac-
count of the history of the dispute and the special mediation and conciliation efforts which
failed to achieve a voluntary resolution of the impasse see Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen v.
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 225 F. Supp. 11, 14-15 (D.D.C. 1964), affd, 331 F.2d 1020 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 918 (1964), and Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & B.B.
R.R., 385 F.2d 581, 588-92 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968).
In contrast, the dispute resolved by Public Law 90-54 was a rather straightforward wage rate
conflict. For the background of this dispute see S. REP. No. 292, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-10
(1967), and H.R. REP. No. 353,90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1967).
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compulsory arbitration to deal with emergency labor disputes on an
ad hoc basis. Public Law 90-54, which followed in 1967, was a simi-
lar special statute requiring temporary third-party settlement of
another railroad labor dispute.37 These statutes and the litigation
surrounding them provide concrete experience by which to test the
theoretical objections to compulsory arbitration.
Constitutional Issues
When a labor dispute threatens to interdict the services of an
industry which is indispensable to the national health and safety,
Congress unquestionably has power under the commerce clause to
enact legislation compelling arbitration of the dispute. Prior to the
passage of Public Law 88-108, the Supreme Court's decision in
Wilson v. New was the most direct precedent upholding a statute
through which Congress itself arbitrated a labor dispute in the
railroad industry.39 In Wilson, the Adamson Act,4" which reduced the
31 Senator Morse, the primary draftsman of Public Law 90-54, has consistently rejected any
characterization of the statute as a provision for compulsory arbitration; rather, he referred to
the dispute settlement process as "mediation to finality." See Hearings on S.J. Res. 80 Before
the Subcom. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 25 (1967); 113
CONG. REc.7783 (daily ed. June 7, 1967); Morse, The Role of Collective Bargaining in Our
Society, 47 ORE. L. REV. 1 (1967). Senator Morse's distinction is that under the provisions of 90-
54 the Special Board is bound to limit its award to the framework established in the collective
bargaining. Most legislators, however, characterized 90-54 as a compulsory arbitration act. See,
e.g., 113 CoNG. REc. 7209 (daily ed. June 14, 1967) (remarks of Representative Devine); 113
CONG. REc. 7791 (daily ed. June 7, 1967) (remarks of Senator Prouty). At any rate, the scheme
of dispute settlement set up by 90-54 clearly fits within the common conception of compulsory
arbitration which emphasizes the mandatory nature of the process. See note 9 supra.
3- 243 U.S. 332 (1917).
11 Although the Adamson Act, ch. 436, § 1, 39 Stat. 721 (1916), did not establish any separate
arbitration panel, at least seven of the Justices in Wilson v. New were of the opinion that the
Court was deciding the constitutionality of a compulsory arbitration law. 243 U.S. at 387, 389.
The Solicitor General, in his argument to the Court, described the Adamson Act as a
compulsory arbitration of the dispute wherein Congress itself had dictated directly the terms of
the award rather than acting through a commission. Chief Justice White's opinion of the Court
suggested no significant distinction between compulsory arbitration and direct legislation,
stating that: "Congress had the power to adopt the act in question, whether it be viewed as a
direct fixing of wages to meet the absence of a standard on that subject resulting from the dispute
between the parties or as an exertion by Congress of the power which it undoubtedly possessed
to provide by appropriate legislation for compulsory arbitration-a power which inevitably
resulted from its authority to protect interstate commerce in dealing with a situation like that
beforc, it. ... Id. at 359. The dissent of Mr. Justice McReynolds, along with the dissent of
Justices Pitney and Van Devanter, accepted the compulsory arbitration terminology as applied
to the legislation. Id. at 387. Mr. Justice McKenna's concurring opinion does not use the term
"compulsory arbitration," but deals with the power of Congress to take any action under the
circumstances. Id. at 360.
4 39 Stat. 721 (1916).
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work day in the railroad industry to eight hours without permitting an
attendant wage reduction, was upheld against a challenge that it
interfered with freedom of contract and deprived the railroads of their
property without due process of law. The majority rationale justified
direct Congressional resolution of the dispute on the ground that the
railroads are a public utility industry in which a work stoppage would
constitute emergency conditions." Since the emergency emanated
solely from the threat of national rail service disruption and not from
any extraneous source, Wilson v. New amounts to a holding that
legislation providing for compulsory third-party settlement of such
labor disputes is reasonable and thus not unconstitutional.
When Public Law 88-108 was enacted to resolve the railroad work
rules dispute no serious doubt existed that the federal commerce
power extended to regulation of the number of employees manning
trains in interstate commerce. The constitutionality of Public Law
88-108 was challenged, however, on a different theory in Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad3
when the railroad unions sought to impeach the arbitration award.
Confronted by the precedent of Wilson v. New," the unions conceded
Congressional power, 5 and instead concentrated their attack on the
allegedly inadequate and insufficient standards which Public Law 88-
108 prescribed for Arbitration Board 282 to follow in determining the
award.46 Relying on statutory language that required the Board to act
with regard for "adequate and safe transportation service to the
public" and for the "interests of the carrier and employees affect-
ed," 47 a comparison was drawn to the language of the Emergency
41243 U.S. at 332, 347, 352.
,1See Brotherhood of Loco. Engineers v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 382 U.S. 423, 425
(1966).
41225 F. Supp. II (D.D.C.), afd, 331 F.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 918
(1964).
" The Wilson precedent was relied upon by President Kennedy in proposing Public Law 88-
108, by the Congress in passing it, and by the courts in upholding its constitutionality. See
Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 225 F. Supp. II (D.D.C.), ajffd,
331 F.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 918 (1964); MESSAGE FROM THE PRESI-
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES RELATIVE TO THE RAILROAD-LABOR DISPUTE, H.R. Doc. No.
142, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963); S. REP. No. 459, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963).
"1225 F. Supp. at 22.
46Id.
1177 Stat. 134.
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Price Control Act, 8 the Fair Labor Standards Act,49 and other regu-
latory legislation which the Supreme Court .had previously upheld
against similar attack. The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia consequently found that Public Law 88-108's
standards were adequately specific to withstand constitutional at-
tack."
Since Public Law 90-54 was enacted under the same
circumstances as prior valid compulsory arbitration laws and
contained materially similar provisions, this 1967 statute also seems
clearly constitutional. Not only was it enacted in response to a
threatened national rail strike, as were the statutes involved in Wilson
v. New and the Burlington Road case,"' but also the standards it
prescribed for deciding the dispute were at least as definite as those
incorporated in Public Law 88-108.52
By adhering to the courts' reasoning in the Wilson and Burlington
Road cases, Congress could validly extend the compulsory arbitration
process to settle labor disputes in other essential industries. The
airlines and communications industries, for example, seem to fit the
"public utility" rationale of Wilson v. New equally as well as does the
railroad industry, and both are already subject to the same kind of
extensive federal regulation now applicable to railroads." A
nationwide strike in such industries would also meet any "emergency
situation" limitation which could be read into either Wilson v. New or
the Burlington Road case. Even if Congress were to extend
compulsory arbitration to a labor dispute in an essential but relatively
"' See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,423 (1944). In fixing prices under the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942, the Administrator was directed to establish fair and equitable prices
and to conform to the standards prescribed by the Act.
4
1See Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941). The declared policy of
the Fair Labor Standards Act was to raise minimum wages to forty cents an hour as rapidly as
economically feasible without substantially curtailing employment.
10 225 F. Supp. 11, 23.
SI See S. REP. No. 292, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967); H.R. REP. No. 353, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967).
"181 Stat. 123. Section 4 of Public Law 90-54 provided standards as follows: "The Special
Board shall make its determination . . . , and shall incorporate the proposal of the Special
Mediation Panel with such modifications, if any, as the Board finds to be necessary to (I) be in
the public interest, (2) achieve a fair and equitable settlement within the limits of the collective
bargaining and mediation efforts in this case, (3) protect the collective bargaining process, and
(4) fulfill the purposes of the Railway Labor Act."
" See Railway Labor Act §§ 201-06, 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-86 (1964); Federal Communications
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1964); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.
(1964).
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unregulated private industry, such as coal or steel, there is very little,
if any, likelihood that the legislation would be struck down on an
"economic due process" rationale. In fact, given Congress' politically
motivated aversion to compulsory arbitration, 4 this mode of
settlement is likely to be employed only in cases of such extreme
danger to the public interest that any economic due process challenge
would be palpably insubstantial. Thus, even with the broadest
standards to guide the arbitrators' decision, no genuine question
should arise concerning the constitutionality of a future ad hoc
compulsory arbitration law.
Defining the Scope of the Compulsory Arbitration Board's Authority
While constitutional power to enact a compulsory arbitration
statute presents few difficulties, the substantive provisions of the
statute itself are not so easily handled. An ad hoc compulsory
arbitration law must define two basic aspects of the arbitrators'
jurisdiction: first, the particular issues that are submitted for the
arbitrators' determination, and second, the scope of the arbitrators'
discretionary power in making decisions. When a compulsory
arbitration law is under consideration, the party opposing the
arbitration will naturally urge incorporation of limits on the board's
discretionary power as well as restriction of the specific issues
submitted to the board. Indeed, by restricting the specific issues and
incorporating decisional guidelines into the law itself, the legislature
may significantly weaken the force of the objection that compulsory
arbitration leaves the parties at the mercy of the economic prejudices
and predilictions of the arbitrators.5 Once a compulsory arbitration
statute is enacted, an arbitrator's violation of his authority under the
enabling legislation provides grounds for a direct action to impeach
the award56 as well as a defense to any suit seeking its enforcement. 7
In any case, an award on issues not submitted to the arbitrator is
totally void.
"See H.R. REP. No. 353, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); 113 CONG. REc. 7789 (daily ed.
June 7, 1967) (remarks of Senator Javits); 113 CONG. REc. 7797 (daily ed. June 7, 1967)
(remarks of Senator Yarborough).
11 See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
"See Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen v. Chicago, B & Q. R.R., 225 F. Supp. 11, 17
(D.D.C.), affd, 331 F.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 918 (1964).
" See ELKOURI, supra note 9, at 26; C. UPDEGRAFF & W. McCoy, ARBITRATION OF LABOR
DispuTEs 125 (1946). See also Justin, Arbitration: Proving Your Case, 10 Lab. Arb. 955,966-68
(1948).
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Public Laws 88-108 and 90-54 employed very different methods to
define the authority of the panels empowered to decide their respective
controversies. In the case of the work rules dispute, Public Law 88-
108 identified the issues committed to arbitration by referring to the
original union and carrier proposals that initiated the dispute, 8 and
left some additional contested issues to the further collective
bargaining of the parties.5 9 As a consequence, that statute provided no
assurance that the entire dispute would be resolved. In contrast, the
frame of reference for the Special Board established by Public Law 90-
54 was a mediation proposal which had previously been made by a
mediation panel, but had been rejected by the parties." Since this
mediation proposal embraced the only issues in the dispute, the
Special Board was authorized to render a binding decision that would
have the certain result of precluding a work stoppage. In practical
effect, 88-108's method of defining the scope of the arbitrators'
authority offered some encouragement for future voluntary collective
bargaining, albeit at more risk to the public interest in uninterrupted
rail service, while 90-54 provided absolute assurance that all issues
would be resolved through governmental mandate. The flexibility of
ad hoc legislation is thus demonstrated by its ability to promote
different and conflicting policies, depending on Congress' assessment
of which best serves the national interests under the circumstances.
The decisional standards incorporated into both Public Laws 88-
108 and 90-54 were much too vague to guide the arbitrators in
resolving the merits of the disputes or to provide adequate protection
for the parties self-interest. 6' Although the 88-108 arbitration board
5S See 77 Stat. 133. Section 3 of Public Law 88-108 provided in part: "The arbitration board
shall make a decision, pursuant to the procedures hereinafter set forth, as to what disposition
shall be made of those portions of the carriers' notices of November 2, 1959, identified as 'Use of
Firemen (Helpers) on Other Than Steam Power' and 'Consist of Road and Yard Crews' and
that portion of the organizations' notices of September 7, 1960, identified as 'Minimum Safe
Crew Consist' and implementing proposals pertaining thereto.
"See S. REP. No. 459,88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963).
"See 81 Stat. 122. The Special Board was directed by Section 3 of the Act to "hold hearings
on the proposal made by the Special Mediation Panel, in its report to the President of April 22,
1967, in implementation of the collective bargaining contemplated in the recommendation of
Emergency Board Number 169." These hearings were intended to determine the basic fairness of
that proposal and its consistency with the public interest. The Special Board was then directed
by section 4 to incorporate the Mediation Panel's proposal in its determination, with such
changes as the hearings indicated were necessary for the decision to comport with the standards
set forth in that section.
6, See notes 47 and 52 supra.
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was restricted by a requirement that it incorporate in its award all
matters on which the parties were in prior agreement, 62 this restriction
was without substance because the board itself was the ultimate judge
of what matters had in fact been agreed upon. 63 The Special Board
established under 90-54 was more constrained, since its decision-
making process started from the definite substantive terms of a prior
mediation proposal, and deviated from those terms only as the Board
deemed necessary to comply with the statutory standards.14 The final
decision of the Special Board was also expressly required to be
"within the limits of the collective bargaining and mediation efforts in
this case. ' 6 The question of who determines the terms which in fact
constitute the limits of collective bargaining, however, was left open.
If the Special Board is the ultimate judge, then this provision is no
more of a substantive limitation than existed under Public Law 88-
108. To adequately protect the parties' interests under ad hoc
compulsory arbitration the statute should explicitly provide for a
band of contract terms within which the arbitrators' decision must
fall. This would be easiest in a straight wage dispute, where the statute
could simply incorporate the terms of each party's last collective
bargaining proposal.66 Otherwise, it is clear that unless there is an
extensive measure of judicial review for compulsory arbitration
awards, the arbitrators' power to effect the essential interest of the
parties is limitless.
Scope of Judicial Review of Compulsory Arbitration A wards
The practical efficacy of procedural safeguards and decisional
standards which are included in a compulsory arbitration statute
depends on the scope of judicial review afforded the arbitration
process. Such review was restricted in Public Law 88-108 by the
11 See 77 Stat. 133. Section 3 of Public Law 88-108 provides in part: "The arbitration board
shall incorporate in such decision any matters on which it finds the parties were in agreement,
shall resolve the matters on which the parties were not in agreement, and shall, in making its
award, give due consideration to those matters on which the parties were in tentative
agreement .. "
"See Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 225 F. Supp. 11, 17
(D.D.C.), affd, 331 F.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 918 (1964).
"See Act of July 17, 1967, Pub. L. No.90-54, § 4,81 Stat. 123.
65 Id.
6The disputed issues in the 1967 railroad dispute were well defined and the final bargaining
proposal of each side could easily have been incorporated within Public Law 90-54. See H.R.
REP. No. 353, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 6-7 (1967).
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incorporation of section 9 of the Railway Labor Act,67 thereby
limiting judicial review of Board 282 rulings to a determination of
whether the award conformed to the provisions of the enabling act.
Therefore, when the unions brought an action to impeach the award in
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad,8 the district court disclaimed any power to review
on the merits, holding that the Board's findings of fact were
conclusive, even in the absence of substantial supporting evidence."
Interpreting the statute as giving the Board wide discretionary powers
to implement its award, the court also sustained the decision against
union challenges that it was inconsistent with Public Law 88-108 in
delegating arbitration of "crew consist" disputes to local
"Adjustment Boards,"70 and in failing to incorporate prior union-
carrier agreements as required by section 3 of the Act.7'
Later cases more clearly demonstrated the Board's virtual
autonomy. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad72 and in Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. Certain Carriers,73 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the substantive and procedural
issues raised in proceedings before the Adjustment Boards were
reviewable only by Board 282, not by the judiciary. On the basis of the
restricted measure of judicial review allowed by section 9 of the
Railway Labor Act, another case held the question whether specific
railroad practices conformed to the substantive mandates of the
award to be within the jurisdiction of the arbitration board rather
67The Railway Labor Act allows impeachment of voluntary arbitration awards on the
following grounds only:
"(a) That the award plainly does not conform to the substantive requirements laid down by
this act for such awards, or that the proceedings were not substantially in conformity with this
Act;
"(b) That the award does not conform, nor confine itself, to the stipulations of the agree-
ment to arbitrate; or
"(c) That a member of the board of arbitration rendering the award was guilty of fraud or
corruption; or that a party to the arbitration practiced fraud or corruption which fraud or
corruption affected the result of the arbitration .... " 45 U.S.C. § 159 (1964).
68225 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C.), affd, 331 F.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 918
(1964).
19 Id. at 17. For a discussion of evidentiary requirements under Public Law 90-54 see note 88
infra.
70 See note 36 supra for an explanation of the "crew consist" issue.
7' 225 F. Supp. at 17. There was no allegation that fraud tainted the award. Id. at 18.
- 345 F.2d 985 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
,3 49 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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than the courts.74 The District of Columbia Circuit also upheld," on
the same grounds, a Board ruling that exempted the Special
Adjustment Boards from the procedural requirements of sections 7
and 8 of the Railway Labor Act,76 which Public Law 88-108 had
expressly applied to arbitration decisions made by Board 282 itself.7
Therefore, by delegating some of its functions to local panels, Board
282 in effect rendered nugatory the procedural safeguards placed
around its own action by Public Law 88-108. 7s The Chicago
Milwaukee ruling did require that Board 282 provide "meaningful
review" of Adjustment Board proceedings to assure that the parties
were accorded due process.79 However, since transcripts and written
opinions, as a rule, did not accompany Adjustment Board decisions,"0
the practical significance of the review provided by Board 282 seems
questionable.
Judicial abstention from reviewing arbitrated questions may be
justified on the ground that it minimizes litigation which might delay
implementation of the award.8' Arguably, such a limitation also tends
to preserve the judgments of an expert panel on technical issues where,
in theory, judges have less expertise. 2 On the other hand, however, the
11 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 380 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 940 (1967).
71 See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 383 F.2d 216 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 933 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. St. Louis S.W. Ry.,
380 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 927 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 380 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 928 (1967).
11 See 45 U.S.C. § § 157-58 (1964). To protect the carriers and the unions from abuse of power
by an arbitration panel, these sections provide that both disputants are to receive a "full and fair
hearing," with the opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence, and be represented by
counsel if they so desire.
"77 Stat. 133. Section 4 of Public Law 88-108 provided in part: "To the extent not
inconsistent with this joint resolution the arbitration shall be conducted pursuant to sections 7
and 8 of the Railway Labor Act, the board's award shall be made and filed as provided in said
sections and shall be subject to section 9 of said Act."
" See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 383 F.2d 216, 218
(D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 933 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 380 F.2d 603, 604 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 927 (1967).
,9 345 F.2d 985, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
"OSee Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 383 F.2d 216,
218 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 933 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. St.
Louis S. W. Ry., 380 F.2d 603,604 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 927 (1967).
S" See Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on the Merits, 63 HARV. L. REv. 681
(1950).
52 In cases involving voluntary arbitration, the Supreme Court has severely limited judicial
intervention, relying to a large extent in its rationale on the special expertise of arbitrators. See
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severely restricted impeachment procedures incorporated in Public
Law 88-108 were designed for voluntary arbitration. 3 In compulsory
arbitration, there are other factors which ought to compel more
extensive judicial review of the award. For instance, the parties did not
assume voluntarily the risk of arbitrators' errors by consenting to the
arbitration.8 4 Furthermore, while the issues involved in compulsory
arbitration are likely to be more crucial to the parties' self-interest, 5
the parties are denied the opportunity which exists under voluntary
arbitration to protect themselves by the terms of the submission
agreement. In view of these factors and the relative infrequency of
recourse to compulsory settlement procedures, the parties should be
accorded the protection of more extensive judicial review than was
provided by Public Law 88-108.
Under Public Law 90-54, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia had exclusive jurisdiction of all suits concerning
the determinations of the Special Board, but the scope of the judicial
review of those determinations was not specified. 6 As a result, section
10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act 7 probably governs the
scope of review for the Special Board's findings and conclusions. In
general, this means that, unlike Board 282, the determinations of the
Special Board could be set aside unless supported by substantial
evidence.8 This standard provides some of the additional needed
protection against the possible bias of arbitrators.
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
The District of Columbia Circuit, which had jurisdiction of all cases arising under Public Law
88-108, recognized the highly technical nature of the problems involved in the work rules dispute
and, apparently in an attempt to provide an adequately'knowledgeable judicial forum, directed
all the 88-108 cases to a single district judge. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron &
B.B. R.R., 385 F.2d 581, 605 n.53 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968).
11 See note 67 supra.
"See Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 58 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Tex.
1943), affd, 146 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 872 (1945); Note, Judicial
Review ofArbitration Awards on the Merits, 63 HARV. L. REV. 681, 682 (1950).
"See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
Act of July 17, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-54, § 5(c), 81 Stat. 124.
815 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1964).
"In prescribing the scope of judicial review of actions by government agencies, the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act provides the following grounds for holding unlawful and setting
aside agency action: "(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without
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The Effect of Temporary Compulsory Arbitration on the Duty to
Bargain
The duty to bargain in good faith is imposed on all industries
covered by either the National Labor Relations Act or the Railway
Labor Act for the purpose of promoting the collective bargaining
process.89 However, when collective bargaining fails and compulsory
arbitration is imposed, the question arises whether enactment of the
compulsory arbitration statute revokes the duty to bargain over those
issues submitted to arbitration. Although Public Law 88-108 was
silent as to whether the statutory duty to seek a bargained agreement
was suspended, the Act did provide that the disputed work rules
arrived at through the compulsory arbitration process were subject to
change by agreement of the parties. 0 Furthermore, the Act's
legislative history stressed a Congressional preference for a volun-
tarily bargained agreement.' Thus, both the language and the his-
tory of the legislation seem to suggest that there should be no alter-
ation of the parties' legal obligation to bargain.
The effect of Public Law 88-108 on the duty to bargain was first
tested when the carriers refused to negotiate proposed changes in the
work rules instituted by the compulsory arbitration award. When the
unions proposed crew consist changes to take effect before the Award
expired and sought a great increase in the employment of firemen
effective the day after expiration, the carriers disclaimed any duty to
bargain on these subjects. In a series of actions brought by the carriers
observance of procedure required by law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence in any case
subject to sections 1006 and 1007 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute; or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court." 5 U.S.C. 1009(e) (1964).
Since Section 3 of Public Law 90-54 expressly directs the Special Board to hold hearings, the
"substantial evidence" requirements of section 10(e) (5) should apply to Board actions. The
provisions of sections 10(e) (1) through 10(e) (4) provide basically the same scope of judicial
review as governed decisions under Public Law 88-108. See note 67 supra.
11 National Labor Relations Act § 8(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964); Labor Management
Relations Act § 8 (b) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (3) (1964); Railway Labor Act § 2, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151, (1964); see NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); Virginian
Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, Ry. Employees, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). See generally Cox,
The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958); Fleming, The Obli-
gation to Bargain in Good Faith, 47 VA. L. REv. 988 (1961).
9"77 Stat. 133. Public Law 88-108 prohibited any change in the work rules from their status at
the time the law was enacted "except by agreement, or pursuant to an arbitration award as
hereinafter provided .. "Id.
" See Preamble to Act of August 28, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-108,77 Stat. 132; S. REP. No. 459,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1963); H.R. REP. No. 713, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1963).
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and the unions for declaratory judgments and injunctions against
threatened strikes, a district court ruled that the union notices were
"premature" and imposed no duty on the railroads to bargain during
the life of the award.92 However, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Akron
& Barberton Belt Railroad,9' reversed the district court's decision and
held that while the award was in force, both parties had a duty to
bargain over any proposals to change the work rules which would
remain in effect after the award expired.94
The conclusions reached by the district court and the court of
appeals in these cases have stunningly different ramifications. On the
one hand, the district court's decision meant that the commitment of
an issue to compulsory arbitration excised it from the scope of
collective bargaining. For example, where firemen were eliminated
pursuant to, the arbitration award, the district court held that
proposals to replace the firemen were non-bargainable.95 The district
court's conclusion that neither a carrier nor a union could proceed to
set aside the resuilts of the award96 implied that the work rules
implemented under the award were not even permissible subjects of
private bargaining and agreement. This result conflicted with the
explicit Congressional preference for a solution reached through
collective bargaining,97 and had the potential of freezing the parties
permanently into those work rules instituted under the compulsory
arbitration award.
On the other hand, the District of Columbia Circuit in Akron
limited the implied abrogation of bargaining obligations to the period
during which Award 282 was effective.98 Even while the award was in
force, only those proposals to become effective before the award
expired were held non-bargainable on grounds that they were
"See Bangor & A. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen & Enginemen, 253 F. Supp. 682,
687 (D.D.C. 1966); Akron & B.B. R.R. v. Order of Ry. Conductors, 253 F. Supp. 538, 539
(D.D.C. 1966); Akron & B.B. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 250 F. Supp. 691, 697
(D.D.C. 1966).
93 385 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968).
Id. at 594-99.
"253 F. Supp. 682, 687 (D.D.C. 1966).
The court's statement was that "[n]either a carrier, nor a union may institute proceedings,
directly or indirectly, to set aside any provision of the Award, or the operations or activities that
have taken place under it or the results that have been achieved." Id.
7See Preamble to Act of August 28, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-108, 77 Stat. 132.
"385 F.2d at 598-99.
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premature. 9 For example, replacement of eliminated firemen after
expiration of the award was held to be a legitimate proposal, subject
to the good faith standards against which all proposals under the
Railway Labor Act must be judged.00 However, in the case of notices
aimed at procuring additional compensation for the individual
firemen laid off under the award, the court of appeals agreed with the
district court that the union had broached a non-bargainable issue. 0'
Reasoning from the premise that unions do not have the authority to
bargain for their members in settlement of past grievances with the
employer,0 2 the circuit court concluded that the unions were without
power to concede any severance benefits accrued to dismissed firemen
under Award 282.103 Since collective bargaining necessarily implies a
"notion of mutuality," including at least the authority to both offer
and concede on each side, the unions' lack of concessions power
effectively precluded bargaining on this issue. 04
In addition to express or implied revocation by the terms of the
compulsory arbitration statute, the duty to bargain may also be
eliminated when an arbitration award so drastically changes
employment practices that a proposal to reinstate former practices is
totally unreasonable. Although not involving compulsory arbitration,
those cases which consider the content of collective bargaining
proposals as evidence of bad faith support this analysis. 05 For
instance, in Vanderbilt Products, Inc. v. NLRB'16 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an employer whose
proposals were so one-sided that they could not conceivably have
been accepted by the union, had violated his duty under the National
Id. at 599.
" Id. at 603. For a discussion of the "good faith" requirements of the duty to bargain, see
American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 169 F. Supp. 777, 793-98 (S.D.N.Y.
1958). Cf. NLRB v. United Clay Mines Corp., 219 F.2d 120, 125 (6th Cir. 1955); NLRB v.
Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134-35 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); Cox,
supra note 89.
101 385 F.2d at 600.
WId. at 603-04, citing Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
lOS 385 F.2d at 603.
0 Id.
"'1See, e.g., Vanderbilt Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 297 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Reed &
Prince Mfg Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134-35 (st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
" 297 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961). The employer in this case had conditioned further negotiations
on union acceptance of a 5-year contract providing for a completely open shop, no union
checkoff provision, and an absolute right on the part of the employer to discharge or lay off
without restriction or seniority limitation.
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Labor Relations Act to bargain in good faith. From the decision in
Akron, however, it is clear that while the content and timing of bar-
gaining proposals may on occasion evidence bad faith," 7 something
more than a mere variance from the terms of the compulsory arbi-
tration award is required to support a finding that the proposals are
in fact non-bargainable.'0°
In summary, the judicial interpretations of Public Law 88-108
indicate that a temporary compulsory arbitration law may partially
revoke the disputants' duty to bargain over certain issues by either
temporarily removing their subject matter from the scope of
mandatory collective bargaining, or by changing the factual context
so that the good faith of the particular bargaining proposals is called
into question. In the absence of a provision expressly revoking the
duty to bargain, enactment of a temporary compulsory arbitration
law provides no basis for inferring permanent changes in the
substantive bargaining duties. During the life of the award, however,
the settlement of other disputed issues may be promoted by
recognizing a temporary respite in the mandatory bargaining over
those points submitted to the arbitration board.' 9 Also, as a practical
matter, the voluntary bargaining process which had failed to provide
an acceptable compromise before compulsory arbitration is unlikely
to be any more successful after the compulsory award has been
instituted. Therefore, where compulsory arbitration is intended as a
temporary solution, the law should be interpreted to withdraw the
disputed issues only temporarily from mandatory bargaining.
Like Public Law 88-108, 90-54 also failed to state expressly its
intended effect on the disputants' duty to bargain." 0 However, since
107 385 F.2d at 597.
Io' d. at 598-603. However, the court noted that the union's proposals in fact called for less
than a total reversion to the status quo ante Award 282; 6000 fewer firemen would have been
required than under the former existing agreement. Id. at 603 n.48.
"'See 385 F.2d at 598.
O There is evidence in the legislative history of Public Law 90-54 to the effect that the parties
have a duty to continue to bargain throughout the two-year period covered by any award under
the statute. See H.R. REP. No. 353, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); 113 CONG REC. 7204 (daily ed.
June 14, 1967) (remarks of Representative Friedel). Representative Jarman's report from the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce expressly disapproved the construction
of Public Law 88-108 that revoked the duty to bargain and stated the Committee's intent that
the legal obligation to bargain continue unabated. H.R. REP. No. 353, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 4
(1967). To support its conclusion that the continued duty to bargain is made "explicit" by 90-54,
the committee report relies on the language in Section 5(a) stating that "'the determination of
the Special Board shall take effect and shall continue in effect until the parties reach
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90-54's Special Board served a mediation function prior to its final
determination of the dispute,"' and since mediation presupposes good
faith bargaining by the parties, Congress evidently intended that the
duty to bargain continue at least until the time limit set for an
agreement by the parties had expired. But with respect to the period
while the dictated settlement terms are in effect, Public Law 90-54 is
mute on the issue of whether the parties have a duty to bargain. '2
Section 5 of the statute, which provides that the deterriination of the
Special Board has "the same effect as though arrived at by agreement
of the parties under the Railway Labor Act," does not decide the
question because the duration. of the hypothetical "agreement" is not
specified."3 A court could, however, reasonably infer a duration of
two years from the fact that the statute provides for this maximum
effective period in the absence of agreement by the parties.'"4 This
construction would mean that Public Law 90-54 has exactly the same
effect on the duty to bargain as did Public Law 88-108: There would
be no duty to bargain over proposed changes in terms and conditions
of employment instituted by the award unless the changes were
proposed for implementation only after expiration of the award." ,5
Impact on State Laws
When Congress enacts a statute regulating the terms of
employment in an industry, such as railroads, which is also regulated
extensively by the states, a conflict may arise between the employment
conditions instituted under federal law and the requirements of state
law. Such a conflict seems to present a classic case for operation of the
agreement' " (emphasis supplied in committee report). Id. This is certainly not the obvious
meaning of this language, but if the committee's interpretation is embraced, unlike Public Law
88-108, the result would require mandatory bargaining during the entire period of the award.
Where such important legal obligations are involved, if the majority of Congress did intend this
result, it would seem that the statute would have been drafted more clearly.
... See Act of July 17, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-54, § 2, 81 Stat. 123; Hearings on S.J. Res. 81
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th
Cong., ist Sess. 25 (1967); 113 CONG. REc. 7783-84 (daily ed. June 7, 1967) (remarks of
Senator Morse).
... But see note 110 supra.
Act of July 17, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-54, § 5(a), 81 Stat. 123.
"' The first sentence of Section 5(a) of 90-54 provides: "If agreement has not been reached by
the parties upon the expiration of the period specified in section 6, the determination of the
Special Board shall take effect and shall continue in effect until the parties reach agreement or, if
agreement is not reached, until such time, not to exceed two years from January 1, 1967, as the
Board shall determine to be appropriate." 81 Stat. 123.
"I See notes 98-100 supra and accompanying text.
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doctrine of federal preemption, under which the state law, possibly a
safety regulation enacted in exercise of the state's police powers,
would be rendered invalid."6 Public Law 88-108 raised this problem
because the ensuing arbitration award provided for the elimination of
firemen while the laws of some states continued to require a fireman
as a part of a specified minimum crew for trains operating within the
state." 7 Six states subsequently repealed their full crew laws,"' and the
Nevada Supreme Court construed the Nevada statute as not applying
to diesel-powered locomotives."9 However, other states retained their
full crew laws, which were predictably challenged by the carriers. In
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad v. Hardin,2 the railroads
argued that two Arkansas full crew statutes' had been superseded by
Public Law 88-108 and Award 282. The carriers further attacked the
Arkansas laws as arbitrary and capricious, as discriminating against
interstate commerce, and as imposing an unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce.' After a three-judge district court struck down
the Arkansas statutes solely on the preemption argument, a Texas
court relied on their holding in the case of Texas v. Southern Pacific
Co.' to invalidate similar laws in that state. On direct appeal,
however, the Supreme Court reversed the district court in the Chicago
Rock Island case, emphasizing the absence of express Congressional
intent to supersede state regulation in this area.'24 The majority of the
Court interpreted the intent of Congress in enacting Public Law 88-
" See, e.g., Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Cloverleaf
Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 154 (1942); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia, 234
U.S. 280, 292 (1914).
"' The states were Arizona, Arkansas, California, Indiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin. See Hearings on
Railroad Work Rules Dispute Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., ist Sess.,
ser. 89-45, at 961 (1966).
"' Mississippi, Oregon, and Nebraska repealed their full crew statutes through legislative
action, while initiative measures submitted to the voters in Arizona, California and North
Dakota eliminated similar laws in those states.
"I Southern Pac. Co. v. Dickerson, 80 Nev. 572, 397 P.2d 187 (1964).
120 239 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ark. 1965), rev'd, 382 U.S. 423 (1966).
1 See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-720 to 73-722, 73-726 to 73-729 (1957). The provisions of the
Arkansas statutes were characteristic of the laws of the other 12 states with full crew regulations.
Generally, the laws provide that no freight train shall be equipped with a crew consisting of less
than an engineer, a fireman, a conductor and a specified number of brakemen. See, e.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 73-720 (1957); IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-1328 to 55-1332 (Burns ed. 195 1).
12 239 F. Supp at 4.
123 392 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
24 382 U.S. at 435.
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108 as meaning to effect as little change as possible in the basic
structure of laws governing the railroad industry while preventing the
disaster of a general rail strike.'25 Where compulsory arbitration is
enacted as a temporary stop-gap measure, as was the case with Public
Laws 88-108 and 90-54, the continued merit of individual state
regulatory laws is unlikely to be carefully considered.'26 Without such
examination, Congress probably did not intend to preempt such state
statutes, even though superficially they appear inconsistent with the
terms of the arbitration award. With this reasoning, the Supreme
Court's holding in Chicago Rock Island established a sound
precedent for measuring the preemption effects of any subsequent ad
hoc compulsory arbitration legislation.
The decision of the three-judge district court on remand of the
Chicago Rock Island case 27 indicates that the compulsory arbitration
award may still have contributed indirectly to invalidating the state
full crew laws. Arguably, by providing for extensive changes in the
manning work rules in other states, Public Law 88-108 so changed the
overall context within which the state statutes operate, that they now
unreasonably burden interstate commerce. Partially on this reasoning
and on the basis of safety records of railroads operating in other
states, the Arkansas district court was convinced that firemen are in
fact superfluous . 28 Accordingly, the three-judge court found the full
crew laws to be "unreasonable and oppressive . ..and . .. [an
unconstitutional] burden [on] interstate commerce." 129
Work Rules in Effect at Expiration of A ward 282
One of the most disturbing features of Public Law 88-108 was the
uncertainty as to whether the imposed work rules would remain in
I [d.
1 Cf Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940). "As a matter of statutory construction
congressional intention to displace local laws in the exercise of its commerce power is not, in
general, to be inferred unless clearly indicated by those considerations which are persuasive of
the statutory purpose." Id. at 614.
"I Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Hardin, 274 F. Supp. 294 (D. Ark. 1967), appeal docketed,
No. 18, Sup. Ct., Dec. 29, 1967.
"I Id. at 303. A contrary result, upholding the constitutionality of almost identical full crew
statutes against similar attacks, was reached by the Supreme Court of Indiana. See Public
Service Comm'n v. New York Cent. R.R., Ind. ,216 N.E.2d 716, cert. denied, 385 U.S.
843 (1966). The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, has also recently declared that
state's full crew statute constitutional, but the holding was based on procedural grounds and did
not reflect any opinion on the merits. See New York Cent. R.R. v. Lefkowitz, 27 App. Div. 2d
735, 282 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1967).
9 274 F. Supp. at 303.
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effect after the expiration of Award 282. While the award was in
effect, severance benefits of some $36,000,000 were paid to dismissed
firemen, and the carriers committed themselves to technical-
operations changes which made a return to the status quo
economically unfeasible.130 Thus, the carriers took the position that
the reduction of train and engine crews remained in effect. The
Brotherhoods, on the other hand, contended that when the award
expired, the work rules requiring a fireman on all runs and the old
level of crew consist were reinstated. In Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Akron & Barberton Belt Railroad' the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court rulings on this issue,
holding that the industry had reached a "new plateau" of work rules
under the award and that subsequent changes in the work rules were
governed by the Railway Labor Act which requires alterations in
existing employment terms to be made only after bargaining.' The
court's holding was based on an assessment of the practical changes
initiated by Award 282, as well as an interpretation of the legal
requirements of the Railway Labor Act.
The Akron case demonstrated that the effect of ad hoc
compulsory arbitration on the continuing terms of employment does
not end with the expiration of the award. In general, a compulsory
arbitration decision is treated the same as a voluntary decision, or a
direct agreement between the disputants. Thus, negotiations for a new
labor contract are begun on the basis of the currently existing terms
of employment, not on the basis of the hypothetical situation that
would have existed in the absence of compulsory arbitration. As a
further progressive influence, the Akron decision promotes a policy of
allowing an industry subject to compulsory arbitration to undertake
technological and operations innovation in reliance on the new terms
of employment instituted under the award.
Enforcement of Federal Compulsory Arbitration Statutes
The feasibility of compulsory arbitration as a method of resolving
national emergency labor disputes ultimately depends upon the
willingness of the disputants to acquiesce in the award, even if
unfavorable, or, in the alternative, upon whether their compliance can
"I See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & B.B. R.R., 385 F.2d 581, 592-94 (D.C. Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968).
131 Id.
"IId. at 592-94.
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be forced by legal pressure. The failure of state no-strike statutes, such
as New York's defunct Condon-Wadlin Act,'33 lends some support to
the argument that settlement processes like compulsory arbitration,
which depend upon outlawing strikes to prevent work stoppages, are
unenforceable.'3 4 However, in the light of the experiences under Public
Law 88-108, this argument has much less force with respect to federal
statutes which have behind them the prestige of the national
government and the enforcement powers of the federal courts.
The efficacy of the federal courts in enforcing compulsory
arbitration laws depends primarily on their jurisdiction to issue
injunctions and restraining orders. The strict policy of judicial non-
intervention in labor disputes, effectuated by the Norris-LaGuardia
Act,'35 exists today in a compromised form.'36 This anti-injunction
statute continues as a forceful expression of the view that the courts
are unprepared to handle the economic issues involved in labor
disputes, and consequently should not have access to a strike-breaking
weapon so susceptible of abuse as the labor injunction. Since neither
Public Law 88-108 nor 90-54 expressly prescribed their effect on the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, the question arises whether section 4 of that
statute'3 7 deprives the federal courts of injunctive jurisdiction to
enforce a federal ad hoc compulsory arbitration law enacted to settle a
dispute over the terms of a new labor contract. Public Law 88-108
seemed to settle the issue by explicitly empowering "any court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties" to issue the necessary
enforcement orders upon suit by the Attorney General.'38 However,
this provision expired 180 days after enactment,'39 and thus could not
"I N.Y. Sess. Law, Ch. 790, § 108 (Condon-Wadlin Act) (repealed 1967). For discussion of
the failure of Condon-Wadlin and its repeal and replacement by the Public Employees' Fair
Employment Act, N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW §§ 200-10 (McKinney Supp. 1967), see Wolk, Public
Employee Strikes-A Survey of the Condon-Wadlin Acts, 13 N.Y.L.F. 69 (1967).
"- See note 32 and accompanying text.
13 29 U.S.C. § 101-15 (1964).
"'See Loeb, Accommodation of the Norris-La Guardia Act to Other Federal Statutes, 11
LAB. L.J. 473 (1960).
13' The relevant part of section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia states: "No court of the United States
shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in
any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons
participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: (a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any
work or to remain in any relation of employment; . 29 U.S.C. at § 104.
M 77 Stat. 134.
139 Id.
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serve as a basis for injunctive jurisdiction to enforce an award which
was binding for two years. Nevertheless, there are cases tracing the
interrelationships of Norris-LaGuardia and the Railway Labor Act
that would bear on this issue under any future legislation similar to
Public Laws 88-108 and 90-54.
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana
Railroad,'0 the Supreme Court confronted an imminent strike which
threatened to subvert the Railway Labor Act's provision for
compulsory arbitration of disputes growing out of grievances or
interpretation of existing agreements, known in the industry as
"minor disputes."' 4 ' In upholding a permanent injunction against the
strike, the Court reasoned that since compulsory arbitration provides
a reasonable alternative to the strike weapon, the labor injunction
cannot have the pernicious effects on labor's interest that prompted
the enactment of Norris-LaGuardia. 42 Secondly, the Court developed
the rationale of accommodating the earlier more general language of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the more specific commands of the 1934
amendments to the Railway Labor Act which included the
compulsory grievance arbitration provision.' 43 The main points of the
Chicago River rationale upholding a permanent anti-strike injunction
would seem to apply with equal cogency to contract negotiations,
referred to as "major disputes,"'' 44 where legislation such as Public
Law 88-108 is in force. The crucial fact behind the Chicago River
exception to Norris-LaGuardia was that a strike would have
frustrated the explicit purpose behind section 3 of the Railway Labor
Act. Clearly, the same threatened subversion of a "pattern of labor
legislation" that the Court found in Chicago River 41 would be present
-', 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
14, See Railway Labor Act .§ 3, 45 U.S.C..§ 153 (1964). In Elgin, J. & E.R.R. v. Burley, 325
U.S. 711 (1945), the Supreme Court distinguished "major disputes" from "minor disputes" as
follows: "[The major dispute] relates to disputes over the formation of collective agreements or
efforts to secure them. They arise where there is no such agreement or where it is sought to
change the terms of one, and therefore the issue is not whether an existing agreement controls the
controversy. They look to the acquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion of rights
claimed to have vested in the past.
[The minor dispute], however, contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already
concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which no effort is made to bring about a formal change
in terms or to create a new one." Id. at 723.
142 353 U.S. 30,41 (1957).
"I Id. at 41-2. See generally Note, Accommodation of the Norris-La Guardia Act to Other
FederalStatutes, 72 HARV. L. Rev. 354 (1958).
", See note 141 supra for an explanation of the "major dispute-minor dispute" distinction.
353 U.S. at 42.
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where a work stoppage in violation of Public Law 88-108 or 90-54 was
imminent. For purposes of determining the effect of Norris-
LaGuardia, there is thus no rational distinction between imposition of
compulsory arbitration in major as well as minor disputes . 46
Therefore, Chicago River should be controlling, and, even without
express statutory authorization, the federal courts should be held to
have jurisdiction to issue injunctions prohibiting strikes in violation of
any ad hoc compulsory arbitration statute.
This conclusion is supported by Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen v. Bangor & Aroostock Railroad,47 a recent major-disputes
case which accepted as its basic premise that "Norris-LaGuardia will
not apply to preclude injunctive relief in cases in which the acts to be
enjoined are in violation of the Railway Labor Act."'48 In Bangor, the
unions challenged the legality of restraining orders issued by the
district court to enjoin a strike on account of the unions' failure to
comply with the necessary bargaining procedures prescribed by the
Railway Labor Act. The District of Columbia Circuit held that the
federal courts had the appendant power, based on the public interest
in avoiding a major rail strike, to preserve the status quo while
determining whether a strike would contravene the mandate of the
Railway Labor Act. The importance of Bangor for the law of
contract negotiation arbitration is twofold. First, it stands as a
"major disputes" case supporting the conclusion which logically
follows from Chicago River that in spite of Norris-LaGuardia, the
federal courts could enforce arbitration awards by injunctive relief.
Second, Bangor's formulation of the appendant jurisdiction rationale
affirms the judicial "power to order maintenance of the status quo"
by precluding litigants from acting on the expectation that the court's
order will be overruled. 50
The District of Columbia Circuit confronted another important
aspect of the problem of judicial enforcement in this area in a
supplemental opinion to Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Akron
6 In Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 362 U.S. 330 (1960), the
Supreme Court did apply section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to deny the federal courts
injunctive power in a case involving a "major dispute." The case is clearly distinguishable,
however, from Chicago River and any case involving a strike in violation of a compulsory
arbitration plan, because the strike involved in Telegraphers violated no relevant statute.
", 380 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968).
' Id. at 583.
I d. at 583-84.
"' Id. at 583.
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& Barberton Belt Railroad.' The union contended that section 8 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act'52 precluded the railroads from obtaining a
restraining order or injunction because the railroads had themselves
breached their duties under the Railway Labor Act. Being consistent
with its prior holdings, the tribunal affirmed the district court's
jurisdiction to enjoin the strikes,' but held that the lower court erred
in deciding that the carriers had not violated the Railway Labor
Act.' 5 The Akron court reasoned that since the railroads had acted
illegally by refusing to bargain on some proper union contract
proposals, section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied with the
result that the district court's injunction was erroneously granted.'"
Nevertheless, because the "clean hands" provision of section 8 did not
affect the jurisdiction of the court, the unions had a duty to obey the
court orders even though invalid. The ruling in Akron is consistent
with an earlier Supreme Court decision holding that section 8 barred
the issuance of an injunction even against violence during a strike
because the carrier had refused arbitration as a method of settling the
dispute.'56 Also, in later cases involving both major' 1 and minor'
disputes, anti-strike injunctions were denied to carriers where they had
failed to comply with Railway Labor Act procedures." 9
Under legislation such as Public Law 88-108 and 90-54, where the
disputants' bargaining obligations are so uncertain, these precedents
requiring strict application of the "clean hands" doctrine could raise
serious legal problems. If the carriers are denied injunctions by section
8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a question arises as to who would
385 F.2d 581, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968).
,52 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1964). Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act states: "No restraining
order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant who has failed to comply with any
obligation imposed by law which is involved in the labor dispute in question, or who has failed to
make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any
available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration." Id.
"1 385 F.2d at 613; see Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen v. Bangor & A.R.R., 380 F.2d 570
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968).
"1 385 F.2d at 613; see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & B.B. R.R., 385 F.2d 581,
599 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968).
I d. at 613-14.
"'See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, Pac. & W.R.R., 321 U.S. 50 (1944).
,' Butte Ati. & Pac. Ry. v. Biotherhood of Loco. Firemen, 268 F.2d 54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 864 (1959) (alternative holding).
,SS Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Engineers, 307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 954 (1963).
"'ISee also Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 936 (1962).
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have standing to apply to the court for an anti-strike injunction to
protect the public against an incapacitating strike. Perhaps on some
extension of the accommodation rationale,10 a court could enjoin the
strike in spite of section 8.161 Of course, the best solution to this
potential dilemma would be to provide explicitly for jurisdiction in the
federal courts to issue the necessary orders upon suit by the Attorney
General. Section (7)b of Public Law 88-108 embodied adequate
language for this purpose.162 If the provision had been simply extended
to remain in force for the duration of the award, the public interest in
maintenance of essential transportation services would have been
better protected-
Conclusion
By preventing the paralysis of a national rail strike, both Public
Laws 88-108 and 90-54 accomplished the purpose of their enactment.
In this respect, the ad hoc compulsory arbitration approach to
national emergency disputes has served the national interest well. The
often cited objection that such statutes are unenforceable must be
significantly discounted in view of this experience. But the plethora of
controversies and litigation that plagued Public Law 88-108 may
support to some extent the argument that compulsory arbitration
exacerbates rather than resolves labor disputes.
Most of the areas of weakness and uncertainty in Public Laws 88-
108 and 90-54 which this comment has examined could be eliminated
in future legislation by more explicit and precise drafting. To
summarize, the analysis of these statutes suggests that a temporary
compulsory arbitration law should expressly provide for the
following:
(1) In granting an injunction or relief under the compulsory
arbitration statute, the jurisdiction of the federal courts shall not be
limited by the Act entitled "An Act to amend the Judicial Code, to
define and limit the jurisdiction of courts sitting. in equity, and for
other purposes," approved March 23, 1932 (29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115);
o See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
,61 See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & B.B. R.R., 385 F.2d 581, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 923 (1968); Loeb, supra note 136.
177 Stat. 134.
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(2) The Attorney General of the United States is empowered to
apply to the courts for an injunction to prevent a strike or lockout at
any time while the compulsory arbitration statute is in effect;
(3) The scope of judicial review of determinations by any special
agency established under the compulsory arbitration statute shall be
the same as that prescribed by section 10(e) of the "Federal
Administrative Procedure Act" (5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011);
(4) The duty to bargain over terms and conditions of
employment by the parties subject to the compulsory arbitration
statute, whether such terms of employment are proposed to take effect
before or after the expiration of the statute, shall not be [shall be]
suspended during the effective period of the statute;
(5) The terms and conditions of employment existing upon the
expiration of the compulsory arbitration statute shall continue in
effect until changed in accordance with the labor laws applicable to
the parties and the industry in question.
Although Public Laws 88-108 and 90-54 are usually viewed at best
as unfortunate precedent,'63 this ad hoc use of compulsory arbitra-
tion may provide an effective alternative to economic warfare
that would have disastrous effects upon our interdependent national
economy. In fact, such ad hoc solutions may be the only alternative to
a general law compelling settlement of labor disputes in all essential
industries, a law which might wholly destroy the fabric of collective
bargaining. So long as Congress can be relied upon to act in similar
national emergencies with swiftness and efficacy, such a permanent
law is unnecessary, and probably undesirable.
63 See Comment, The Railway Work Rules Dispute-A Precedent for Compulsory
Arbitration, 14 DEPAUL L. REv. 115 (1964).
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